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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

•

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

•

v.

COOPERJOHN ANTHONYVAN
HUIZEN,

•
•
•

Court of Appeals Case No. 20140602-CA
District Court Case No. 131902542
Juvenile Court Case No. 1003447

Defendant/Appellant.

I.

THE CORRECTNESS STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIES TO THE
JUVENILE COURT'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER ACT.
The State argues that this Court should apply a deferential abuse of discretion

standard of review to the juvenile court's retention detennination under the 2013

•

amendments to the Serious Youth Offender Act. The State argues that juvenile court
determinations should be affumed on appeal unless "no reasonable person" would disagree
with them, as the determinations tum on a best interests conclusion reached through a

•

weighing process by judges who routindy work with juveniles. State's brief at 2, 37-39.
While the State itself does not actually defer to the juvenile court's factual findings, 1 the

•

1 The State argues that factual findings are reviewed for clear error, State's brief at 3,
but presents facts inconsistently with the juvenile court's factual findings without making any
effort to marshal the evidence or prove the court's findings clearly erroneous. The State
suggests that Cooper may have been one of the people holding a gun d ~ the robbery,

•
State's legal arguments reiterate a theme of deference due to the juvenile court's factual

•

analysis. ·See~ State's brief at 11-12, 36-48.
This Court recently rejected a similar argument in a case decided under the 2013
version of the Act, In re F.L., 2015 UT App 224, ,r17, 2015 UT App LEXIS 224. While the

•

Court recognized that juvenile courts do have discretion in making best interest
determinations and in weighing statutory factors, their discretionary rulings must be
premised on correct statutory interpretation. Id. at n.3. Accordingly, controlling authority
holds that as to the 2013 Serious Youth Offender Act retention factors, juvenile courts'
statutory interpretations and applications of the Serious Youth Offender Act are legal
conclusions entitled to no deference on appeal. In re F .L., at ,r 17. See also, ~ In re
W.H.V., 2007 UT App 239, ,r 3, 164 P.3d 1279 Guvenile court's interpretation of statutory
retention factors reviewed for correctness); State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r 9, 79 P.3d 951
(legal conclusions in juvenile court retention rulings are reviewed for correctness); Gutierrez
v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998) (court reviews application and interpretation of
statute for correctness, granting no deference to the lower court).

•

and as ifhe may have carried a switchblade during the robbery. State's brief at 5-6. The
juvenile court expressly found that no evidence that Cooper brandished a gun and
insufficient evidence that he harbored a switchblade during the robbery (R 195,372). The
State suggests that Cooper may have taken Christian Davidson's phone and wallet on Dexter
Skinner's command during the robbery. State's brief at 6. The juvenile court did not find
that Cooper took anyone's property. The court found that Cooper's role in the robbery was
to plan, provide two of the guns, and be present (R. 195-96).
2

•

•
•

Review of the juvenile court's interpretation and application of the SYOA statute for
correctness demonstrates that reversal is required because the juvenile court misinterpreted

•

•

and misapplied the statutory retention factors .

THE JUVENILE COURT'S MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE
STATUTORY RETENTION FACTORS REQUIRE REVERSAL .

II.

The State repeatedly argues that Cooper has shown no clear error or abuse of

•

discretion in the bindover decision, and that the convictions should be affinned because no
reasonable person would disagree with the juvenile court's factual analysis. State's brief at
36-48.

•

Cooper is challenging the juvenile court's interpretation and application of the
retention factors in the 2013 Serious Youth Offender Act, not the juvenile court's findings

•

of fact. Opening brief of appellant at 1, 13-14, 31-44. Accordingly, the rulings at issue are
reviewed for correctness. See Point I.
The State argues as if the uncontested findings of the juvenile court that Cooper

•

facilitated and participated in violent crimes foreclose Cooper's being able to meet his
burden to justify retention under the Serious Youth Offender criteria. State's brief at 11-12.

•

As the Serious Youth O ffender statute reflects and as our case law demonstrates, virtually
every minor charged under the Serious Youth Offender Act has arguably participated in
violent crimes. This does not ipso facto mean that retention is impossible. Rather, this means

•
•

that probable cause may exist for the offenses charged, and that careful and detailed

3

•
retention analysis is required. See, e~ Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702 (1) (listing the largely

•

violent crimes subject to prosecution under the SYO Act) and (3) (requiring analysis of
retention factors if probable cause is established); Lar~ 2003 UT App. 318,_ ,I 28,

...

(recognizing that virtually everyone would be bound over in SYO cases if violence of crimes

•

sufficed to justify bindover, as all SYO crimes are violent by nature); In re FL., 2015 UT
App 224, ,I 27 (same). Correct analysis of the retention factors here demonstrates that the
juvenile court's ruling sending Cooper into the adult system must be reversed.

A.

•

Relative Culpability

The closest the State comes to addressing Cooper's actual claim that the juvenile court
judge misinterpreted the relative culpability factor is to argue in one sentence that the

•

juvenile court was only required to consider relative culpability, and was not required by
statute to articulate relative culpability in actual findings. State's brief at 43.
The State's argument overlooks the important roles of findings of fac! in our justice

•

system - to resolve factual disputes in a way that informs the parties of the court's analysis,
and to facilitate appellate review of the lower court's analysis. In Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill

•

Mangum Inv., 766 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1988), this court explained the important functions
served by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), which generally requires trial courts to enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law to avoid reversal. 2 The Court explained:

2 Rule 52(a) applies in criminal cases by virtue of Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e). E.g.• State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).

•
•

4

•

•
•

•

The rule serves two important purposes. First, findings of fact function to inform
the parties about the "mind of the court" and the analysis the court used to resolve
the dispute. Id. As the Supreme Court stated in LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18
Utah 2d 260,420 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966), "the right to resort to the courts for the
adjudication of grievances and the settlement of disputes is a fundamental and
important one. An indispensable requisite to fulfilling that responsibility is the
determination of questions of fact upon which there is disagreement." 420 P.2d at
616. Secondly, findings of fact provide a basis on which an appellate court can review
the judgment. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 1983)C'Proper findings are
essential to enable this Court to perform. its functions of assuring that the findings
support the judgment and that the evidence supports the findings.'').
Dover at 426.

•

Serious Youth Offender case law confirms that the juvenile court's findings are viewed
as r~flecting the court's consideration of the statutory factors. For instance, in interpreting

•

the 2013 SYO statute in In re F.L., 2015 UT App 224, ,r17, this Court reviewed the juvenile
court's findings of fact on the retention factors as if they encompassed the totality of the
juvenile court's analysis. Id. at ,Mr 17, 20-31. Thus, this Court should reject the State's tacit

•

argument that inadequacies in the juvenile court's findings are properly ameliorated by the
assumption that the juvenile court was thinking something other than what is reflected in its

•

findings .
The State's contention that it was enough for the juvenile court to find Cooper's
participation "significant'' after claiming to compare Cooper's behavior to his codefendants',

•

State's brief at 39-44, is not supported by the law. The law requires juvenile court judges to
determine the juvenile's conduct and compare it to his codefendants', and determine if the

•
•

juvenile's culpability is greater or lesser than the codefendants. Here, the juvenile court

5

·•
judge was adjudicating a case involving five codefendants. The court did not detail the

•

behavior of any codefendant but Joshua Dutson, the other minor whose case was joined
with Cooper's for purposes of the SYO preliminary and retention hearing. Aside from once
mentioning that Cooper's participation at the scene was "less at the scene of the crime than

•

others," the court did not find that Cooper's was more or less culpable than any other
defendant's, but simply characterized his culpability as significant (R. 195). Under Lara 2003
UT App 23, ,r 27, and F.L., 2015 UT App 224, ,r 24, the juvenile court misinterpreted and
misapplied the statute.

B.

Extent of Violence, Aggression and Premeditation in Role in the
Offense

The State argues that Cooper provided the guns knowing they would be used in a

•

''home invasion" robbery. State's brief at 46. This argument is not and.cannot be supported
by a citation to the record, as there is no evidence to this effect. While there is inconsistent
evidence, some of which supports the claim of a home invasion robbery, ~ opening brief
of appellant at 26-28, there is no evidence that Cooper was aware when they took his father's
guns that there would be a forced entry or home invasion.
The State seeks to distinguish Lara by quoting snippets of the juvenile court's ruling
that discuss Cooper's knowledge and actions. State's brief at 45-46. By reading the juvenile
court's complete analysis of this factor, the Court will readily confirm that the juvenile court
did not focus the role in the offense findings on Cooper's behavior. Rather, to a large

6

•

•

•

extent, the court held Cooper accountable for the violence, aggression and premeditation of
his codefendants because he was an accomplice to their crimes. 3 As virtually all SYO crimes
are to a degree violent, aggressive and premeditated by nature, the court should have
compared Cooper's behavior to his co-defendants' rather than holding Cooper responsible

•

for their violence, aggression and premeditation. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ,r 29-33 .
Particularly because the 2013 amendments require inquiry into the extent to which Cooper's
role was violent, aggressive and premeditated on a spectrum, see In re F.L., ,r 28, the juvenile
court should have distinguished Cooper's role in the offense as less violent, aggressive and
premeditated.

•
3 The court ruled:

•

•
•
•

5. Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent aggressive,
or premeditated manner.
a. These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The
guns bdonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in
the burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not
a spur of the moment decision.
b. Mr. Van H uizen was with co-defendants who forced their way at gun point
into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home.
c. The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's
planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be
used in a burglary and robbery for drugs.
d Mr. Van Huizen's presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the
victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home.

(R. 195-96).

7

•

•
C.

•

The Public Safety Interest

In arguing the public safety factor, the State, like the juvenile court, echoes the
outdated thinking ofM.E.P. v. State, 2005 UT App 227, ,I 14 n. 4, 114 P.3d 596; and State
ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098-99 (Utah App. 1997), that public safety is best served by

•

moving Serious Youth Offenders into the adult system, where potential sentences nonnally
exceed the limited years of jurisdiction remaining in the juvenile court. State's brief at 47.
The primary reason the Serious Youth Offender Act was amended in 2013 was that
.

.

the legislature recognized that ttansfe.tring juveniles, particularly first time offenders who
have not exhausted the resources of the juvenile court, into the adult system is
counterproductive to public safety. See Legislative History for House Bill 105, in Tab 5 to
the Opening Brief of Appellant. The legislature recognized that when minors are placed in
.the adult system, they become more prone to recidivism, particularly violent recidivism,
when they are housed with adult felons and are not given the age and developmentally
appropriate intervention that is readily available in the juvenile system. See id. The
legislature was also prompted to enact the 2013 amendments because it learned that juveniles
are actually usually given probation or short sentences to compensate for their being thrust
into the adult system, and are released without appropriate reformative services to decrease
the chances of recidivism. See id.
The State makes no effort to defend the juvenile court's public safety analysis turning
on the serious nature of the offenses charged, and the potential volatility and hypothetical
threats the offenses can pose to perpetrators, the police and the public, given that others
8

•

•

•

may respond violently to such crimes (R. 196). Nor does the State defend the juvenile
court's penalizing Cooper for having a "loving family and good home," _which leads to the

•

conclusion that the public interest would be served by trusting his parents to work with him
in the juvenile system to refonn him. Compare Opening brief of appellant at 39-41 with
State's briefpassim.

D.

•

Cooper's Interest in Remaining in Juvenile Court

The State argues that the juvenile court considered Cooper's interests and
vulnerabilities in finding that his interests weighed in favor of retention. State's brief at 48.

•

The page of the juvenile court record the State relies on,J.R 31, contains the juvenile court's
perfunctory finding that by clear and convincing evidence, it would be contrary to Cooper's
best interest to be bound over to district court. It does not reflect any detailed or specific

•

consideration of the refonnative benefits of the juvenile court and the risks befalling minors
in the adult system, which are explained in Cooper's opening brief and the State does not

•

contest.

E.

•

Absence of Weapons Offense and Number and Nature of Prior
Offenses

Citing to pages 28 and 30 of the juvenile court record, the State contends that the
juvenile court found that the first and fourth statutory retention factors weighed in Cooper's

•

favor. State's brief at 46-47. On pages 28 and 30 of the juvenile court record, the court
found that Cooper ''has no prior juvenile record" G.R 28) and that this case is his first ·
9

•
offense O.R. 30). The court's findings did not expressly consider the first and fourth factors

•

-- whether Cooper had a prior adjudication for a weapons offense that would be a felony for
an adult, and the "number and nature of his prior offenses."
In sum, the record demonstrates that the juvenile court misinterpreted and

•

misapplied the retention factors in the Serious Youth Offender Act. Because all of the
retention factors should have weighed in favor of Cooper's being retained in juvenile court,
see, e__£., opening brief of appellant at 32-35, 36-38, 39-42, there is a reasonable probability of
a more favorable result in the absence of the errors. As a result of the individual and
cumulative prejudice from the errors, reversal is in order. See F.L., 2015 UT App 224, ,r 32
(reversing SYO bindover ruling because in the absence of the juvenile court's
misinterpretation and misapplication of two and perhaps three of the retention factors, there

•

was a reasonable probability of retention).

III.

COOPER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS.

A.

OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT AND PREJUDICIAL FAILURE TO
RESEARCH AND ASSERT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
BEHIND THE 2013 AMENDMENTS TO THE SERIOUS YOUTH
OFFENDER ACT

The State does not contest the importance of effective assistance of counsel in the
SYO proceedings, see Opening brief of appellant at 15.
The State argues that Cooper's SYO counsel had no obligation to research the

10.

•

•

•

legislative history of the 2013 amendments to the SYO statute and inform the court, and the
court had no duty to inquire as to the legislative intent behind the amendments in the law,

•

because the 2013 amendments continue to disallow inquiry into the rehabilitative potential
and mental condition of juveniles. State's brief at 10. The State reasons that this is so

•

because the amended statute, unlike the contemporary version of the certification statute,
did not expressly require consideration of a juvenile's rehabilitative potential and mental
condition. State's brief at 10, 13-18, 26-27. The State posits that factors such as a juvenile's

•

rehabilitative potential or mental condition were not relevant under the 2013 SYO statute, as
they are not among the exclusive list of factors courts are allowed to consider in weighing

•

the interests of the public and the juvenile, set forth in in 78A-6-702(3)(c). State's brief at
23-25. The.State relies on A.B. and M.E .P., which interpret pre- 2013 versions of the SYO
act as barring consideration of juveniles' rehabilitative potential, State's brief at 29. The State

•

points out that in the 2015 amendments to the SYO Act, the legislature expressly recognizes
that the bests interests of the public and juvenile inquiries necessarily turn on assessment of

•

the juvenile's capacity for rehabilitation and whether the juvenile or adult system is most
likely to neutralize any threat posed by the juveniles, and that this 2015 legislation
demonstrates that the law was different in 2013 before it was amended. State's brief at 29-

•

30.
The 2013 SYO statute added the requirement of ultimate weighing of whether

•

sending the juvenile into the adult system would be contrary to the public interest in general
the juvenile's interest in general, Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(b), and added in the list of
11

•
subsidiary considerations the question of whether the public safety interest is better served

•

by keeping juveniles in juvenile court or sending juveniles into the adult system, and the
nature and nwnber of the defendant's prior juvenile court adjudications. § 78A-6702(3)(c)(iv) and (v). Under standard rules of statutory construction, statutory amendments

•

are presumed to alter existing legal rights. Alternatively, they are viewed as clarifying
previous legislative intentions. E.g., Hercules Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n., 2000 UT App 372,

,r 13, 21 P.3d 231.

The statutory amendments in the 2013, requiring retention analysis to

weigh the public interest and the juvenile's interest and public safety interest, added terms

•

which, when read in context, plainly called for full inquiry into the juveniles' risk of reoffense and amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system.
To the degree that the very broad and general terms were ambiguous, in light of the
extant case law such as A.B., which the legislature ostensibly intended to change or clarify,
Hercules, this required inquiry into the legislative history to determine what the legislature
intended by the amendments requiring weighing of the public interest, juvenile's interest, and
consideration of public safety. See Tab 4 to opening brief of appellant (showing text of 2013
amendments). Our law recognizes when the plain language of statutes does not clearly
reflect what the legislature intended, it is entirely appropriate to resort to legislative history to
clarify legislative intent. See, ~ Sullivan v. Scouler Grain Company of Utah, 853 P .2d 877,
880 (Utah 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT
36, ,r 12, 48 P.3d 218. As the State does not contest, the legislative history behind the 2013
amendments to the SYO Act shows the amendments were designed to serve the interests of
12

•

•

•

the public and juveniles in reducing recidivism by having juveniles who are amenable to
reform, particularly first time offenders such as Cooper, utilize the resources in the juvenile

•

system, rather than entering the adult system. See Tab 5 to Cooper's opening brief. Given
the essential legislative history, e.g. Sullivan, full inquiry into Cooper's amenability to
treatment and low risk of re-offense was essentia1 under the 2013 amendments.
Trial counsel should have investigated and asserted the pertinent law, as this is a
lawyer's fundamental duty under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984). His

•

•

failure to do so was objectively deficient. See id.

B.

OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT AND PREJUDICIAL FAILURE TO
PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY AND OTHER INFORMATION
BEARING ON RETENTION

In response to Cooper's claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert

•

testimony and other information necessary to an accurate assessment of the retention
factors, opening brief at 19-24, the State relies on its argument that the 2013 amendments to

•

the SYOA did not require inquiry into Cooper's mental functioning or amenability to
treatment. State's brief at 31-32. Cooper refuted this argument in subpoint III A., supra.
Assuming arg11endo the State is correct, much of the evidence that counsel failed to

•

present through Dr. Davies or other means was admissible under Houskeeper v. State, 2008
UT 78, 197 P.3d 636, prior to the 2013 amendments, and has nothing t~ do with whether

•

Cooper's mental condition and amenability to rehabilitation. See Cooper's opening brief at
20-24 (Inter alia addressing public safety and Cooper's safety). The State has not refuted
13

•
Cooper's claims that counsel was objectively deficient in failing to present such evidence.

•

The State argues that even if the 2013 statute did require consideration of amenability
to rehabilitation in the juvenile system, given the case law such as A.B., precluding inquiry
into this topic, SYO counsel and the juvenile court committed no obvious error in failing to

•

inquire into Cooper's amenability to treatment. State's brief at 11, 31-34.

As to whether counsel and the court should have rested on AB. and the pre-2013
law, SYO counsel and the juvenile court had the fate of a child in their hands. 4 They were
tasked with adjudicating his fate under statutory amendments that utilized broad and
ambiguous terms that either intended to change or clarify the extant law, see Tab 4 to
Cooper's opening brief. See,~ Hercules Inc., sll_/Jra. No reasonable attorney or court in
such circumstances would safely assume that it is permissible to rely on case law that
predated broad and general statutory amendments that necessarily changed or clarified the
prior law. Id. Rather, counsel and the court were obviously required to either apply the
broad statutory language by conducting a comprehensive inquiry, or to review readily

4
In Utah, our juvenile courts exist because we recognize that children are in their
formative years, and if given appropriate education, rehabilitation and treatment within their
families, can grow to be productive members of society. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if
16, 63 P.3d 667. We keep children in the juvenile court where their best interests are the
primary focus, to redirect their behavior toward obedience to the law, and to protect them
from the adverse consequences of more severe sentences and permanent records attendant
to adult courts. See id See also, Houskee er v. State, 2008 UT 78, ff 27 and 50 and n.21.
ending a child into the adult system is a life-changing event that can have literally fatal
consequences. See,~ opening brief of appellant at 18-19 n.5; Katz Levi, "State v. Mohl:
State Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and
accompanying notes (2007)(explaining how incarcerating children in the adult system
increases the risk of suicide).

•
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•

available legislative history and ascertain legislative intent to detennine how to do their very
important jobs properly, ~ Sullivan, sll}ra. And they were on notice that important

•

inquiries under the Serious Youth Offender Act may well require the assistance of qualified

experts, see Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, mf 27 and 50 and n.21.

•

As the State does not contest, this Court may reach the merits of Cooper's position
through the exceptional circumstances doctrine. See Cooper's brief at 1, 3, 44. Significant
changes in the law such as occurred in the 2013 amendments to the SYO Act shortly before

•

Cooper's preliminary hearing justify resorting to this doctrine in order to reach the correct
results under the amended law. See~ State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134 n.2. (Utah

•

1994) (addressing merits of state constitutional clahn raised for the first time on certiorari
under exceptional circumstances ~octrine as a result change in the case law during the
pendency of the case); T.M. v. State, 2003 UT App 191, ,r 16, 73 P.3d 959 (applying

•

excepti!Jnal circumstances doctrine because parties' failure to raise issue below may have
been influenced by statutory amendment that changed the law).

•

The State argues that Cooper was not prejudiced by the absence of a psychological
evaluation or other information showing Cooper's amenability to reform.. The State reasons
this is so because the juvenile court supposedly violated the statute and considered Cooper's

•

parents' opinion and lawyer's argument that he was amenable to rehabilitation and was still
convinced of the facts confirmed by the psychological evaluation -- that Cooper's facilitating

•

and participating in violent crimes required him to enter the adult system. State's brief at 11,
34-36.
15

•
Despite confirming the facts of Cooper's facilitating and participating in the serious

•

crimes charged, the Davies evaluation was powerful science-based evidence that the public
safety interest was best served by Cooper's remaining in the juvenile system, where he could
readily rehabilitate back to his law-abiding nature. See Cooper's opening brief at 20-22

•

(summarizing Dr. Davies' evaluation). The evaluation provides a wealth of information
pertinent to the retention factors and showed that Cooper is a low risk of re-offense, and
that the public safety interest, the public's general interest, and Cooper's interest all were best
served by allowing him to reform in the juvenile systems. Compare Houskeeper, supra.
As is detailed in Point II of Cooper's opening brief and explained further herein, the
juvenile court's assessment of the retention factors was skewed against Cooper by the court's
misinterpretation of the statutory retention factors. There is a reasonable probability of a
more favorable result when any or all of the court's analytical errors stand corrected. There
is an independent probability of a more favorable result in the absence of trial counsel's

failure to inform the court of the legislative intent behind the 2013 amendments, the court's
failure to investigate the legislative intent, and counsel's failure to present the evidence
bearing on the retention inquiry under the 2013 amendments. The facts of this case when
viewed through the SYO statutory factors require that Cooper remain in juvenile court.
See,~ Cooper's opening brief at 5-13 (summarizing record of case) and at 32-35, 36-38,
39-42 (explaining justification for retention); and at 19-24 (explaining evidence and
information that should have been presented in support of retention case). Accordingly,
reversal is in order.
16
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•

C.

OBJECTIVELY DEFICIENT AND PREJUDICIAL FAILURE ~O
PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE AND COMBAT IMPROPER
EVIDENCE

The State argues that because the juvenile court could see Cooper's size and learned
through the prosecutor's argument of the ages of the codefendants, counsel reasonably did
not argue or inform the court that Cooper was the youngest and second to the smallest codefendant. State's brief at 50. The State argues that counsel had no obligation to inform the
court that Wesley Brown and Dexter Skinner, the oldest two codefendants, had multiple

•

felony cases pending, as this was not germane to any statutory retention factor. State's brief
at 50. The State argues counsel reasonably did not inform the court that Cooper wanted

•

police protection before he would reveal Wesley Brown's participation, as the relevance of
this evidence is unclear. State's brief at 51. The State argues that counsel reasonably opted
not to inform the court of Dexter Skinner's expressed regret that Cooper, a "good kid," and

•

Joshua Dutson were involved, as this would have introduced evidence that Cooper was
involved in the robbery, and the court may not have cared about Skinner's opinions. State's

•

brief at 52.
All of the aforementioned evidence was readily available and important to show that
Cooper was relatively less culpable and susceptible to the older, larger and more

•

sophisticated defendants, who were not present for the juvenile court to see. The evidence
was important to show that Cooper qualified for retention in the juvenile court under Utah

•

Code Ann.§ 78A-6-702(3)(u). The evidence also aids in understanding Cooper's role in the
offense as a manipulated pawn of the older, larger, more sophisticated, codefendants, and
17

•
that Cooper thus qualified for retention in the juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-

•

6-702(3)(iii). Cooper's relative vulnerability and lack of sophistication and criminality vis-a-

vis his codefendants also informs the relatively lesser public safety risks Cooper poses, and

his and the public's general interest in his remaining in juvenile court, see Utah Code Ann.§

•

78A-6-702(3)(b) and (c)(v).
The unrefuted impressions left by the prosecutor's argument and evidence were that
Cooper was operating with co-equal peers and was not influenced by anyone as they were all
the same age (R. 363), and that Cooper was refusing to tell the police the truth about Wesley
Brown's participation (R. 292-93). Helping the court to understand the truth that Cooper
was very susceptible to the influence of the older, larger and more criminally involved
codefendants, and that his fear of Wesley Brown was the impediment to Cooper's telling the
police of Wesley's participation, were essential to the court's having an accurate
understanding of the case and reaching an accurate, reliable result.
Evidence was presented without objection that there were multiple robberies the day
of the charged offenses, wherein the five suspects had robbed multiple victims of cologne, a
leather jacket, and marijuana, supposedly in Ogden, North O gden, Harrisville, and Roy (R.
285-86). It was important that the court understand that Cooper was not charged in the
other crimes, whereas the oldest two defendants were, as this certainly bore on the public
safety issue, the relative culpability issue, and the role in the offense issue, as it shows who
the driving forces were behind the crimes Cooper was charged in as an accomplice. As
Cooper's advocate, counsel was charged with investigating and presenting this relevant and
18
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•

important defense evidence. E .g. Strickland, supra.
In arguing lack of prejudice, the State argues twice that Detective Barker admitted

•

that Cooper did not participate in other robberies. State's brief at 56. The State is
misreading the record. Detective Barker testified on direct examination that there were
multiple robberies committed by the five suspects, also referred to as "tl_iese boys," including
the charged offenses in Roy, and offenses in Ogden, Harrisville and North Ogden (R. 28586). On cross-examination, the detective did not testify that that Cooper and Joshua were

•

not involved in any other robberies, as the State claims, citing to R. 307. Rather, in this
testimony, the detective agreed with counsel for Dutson that Cooper and Dutson were not

•

involved in any offenses on the 3rc1 or the 5th, the days of the incriminating text messages
before and after the day of the robberies on the 4th. and the detective opined that this was
because the police caught them on the 5th (R. 307) .

•

The State claims that counsel had no obligation to make a futile objection to the
court's imputing the conduct of the codefendants to Cooper in assessing Cooper's role in

•

the offense because the court focused on Cooper's behavior. Actually, in assessing Cooper's
role in the offense, the court did impute much of the violent, aggressive and premeditated
conduct of the codefendants to Cooper (R. 195-96). Thus, counsel had an obligation to

•

object under Lara, 2005 UT 70, ,nf 28-33. See, e~ State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ,r
10, 67 P.3d 1005 (recognizing duty to preserve client's claims); State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d

•

688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing duty to assert current beneficial law) .
In response to Cooper's claim that counsel should have challenged Christian
19
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•
Davidson's inconsistent claims to the effect that the robbery was a ''home invasion"

•

robbery, Cooper's brief at 26-28 and n.10, the State argues that the dispute about the home
invasion or forced entry was of no importance, given the violent robbery that occurred
inside the home. State's brief at 52-53. 'This overlooks the juvenile court's repeated

•

references to the forced and armed entry and breaking into the home in the oral and written

rulings sending Cooper into the adult system. See tabs 1 and 2 to Cooper's opening brief.
From the court's rulings, it is clear that the court's belief that this was a home invasion
robbery weighed significantly in the court's assessment of the case.
The State argues that Cooper was not prejudiced by any of the errors because he has
consistently admitted to the facts underpinning the juvenile court's bindover order - that he
participated in and facilitated violent crimes. State's brief at 53. Involvement in violent
crints does not preclude retention in juvenile court. Rather, it is consistent with being
'

charged under the SYOA, which necessarily involves juveniles who have been involved in
violent crimes, who are nonetheless entitled to having their cases carefully and accurately
adjudicated in court. See~ Lara, 2003 UT App 318, mf 28-29.
With regard to Cooper's claims about the impropriety of the join~ SYO preliminary
hearing with Joshua Dutson and the hearsay that came in without objection, the State argues
that counsel strategically opted for the joint hearing, as this was to Cooper's advantage so the
court would juxtapose Cooper's conduct with Joshua Dutson's, and find Cooper less
culpable. State's brief at 43.
The juvenile court was statutorily required to compare Cooper's behavior from that
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•

of all other codefendants in assessing his relative culpability,~ Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6702(c)(ii), and having Cooper's hearing held jointly with Joshua Dutson's was unnecessary to

•

achieve this end. Cooper was put at risk by the joint hearing because Joshua Dutson's
hearsay was hannful, as he initially claimed that Cooper had a gun during the robbery, and
then claimed that Cooper had a switchblade (R. 285-86). The only other evidence suggesting
that Cooper held a gun came &om Christian Davidson, who thought that only three people
came into his home, and initially thought that Cooper was the third gunman who took his

•

wallet and phone (R. 247,253,310). Later in the hearing, however, Christian became unsure
that Cooper was the third person who entered his home (R. 257), and the police ascertained

•

by Joshua's admissions that Joshua Dutson was the third gunman (R. 284,289). Contrary to
the State's contention on page 57 of its brief, Dutson's hearsay statement that everyone
agreed to the robbery plan was prejudicial, because Cooper's text message conversations the

•

day before the robbery do not show that Cooper agreed to provide the guns for the actual
robbery that occurred. See State's Addendum G.

•

The State's argument that hearsay is admissible in SYO preliminary hearings, State's
brief at 55-56, is accurate only as to the first portion of SYO hearings, wherein the State
establishes probable cause. See Utah R. Juv. P. 22G). In the retention portion of the SYO

•

preliminary hearings, there is no rule authorizing presentation of hearsay. Rather, the rule
reflects the juveniles' rights to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See Utah R Juv. P. 23A(d). 5

•

Assuming that the hearsay were otherwise permissible, as the State does not contest,
5 Page 28 of Cooper's opening brief erroneously cited subsection (3) of Rule 23A.
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•
the hearsay from Joshua Dutson and other codefendants was constitutionally unreliable as a

•

result of their need to curry favor with the police, see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130-31
(1999); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126-28 (1968); and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 545 (1986).

•

And the extrinsic crime evidence was nonetheless inadmissible under Utah Rules of
E~dence 403 and 404. The prejudice stemming from extrinsic crime evidence is recognized
..
as a matter of law. E.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,686 (1988); State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

IV.

THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE'S FAILURE TO RECUSE REQUIRES
REVERSAL.
The State argues Cooper has not shown plain error in the judge's failure to recuse.

State's brief at 57-64. The State argues as if Cooper must show that the court violated either
a statute or settled Utah case law to show obvious error, State's brief at 58, and as if Cooper
must show actual bias on the part of the judge to show prejudice in the plain error test.
State's brief at 64, citing State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, iJ 28, 2015 UT App LEXIS 174
and State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah 1997).
The State's definition of plain error is too narrow. Obvious error is established if a
court ruling violates settled appellate case law or the plain language of a statute or rule, and if
the Court's confidence in the verdict is undermined as a result of the error or if there is a

•
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•

reasonable likelihood of a better result absent the error. See, ~

State v. Isom, 2015 UT

App 160, ,r 28, 2015 UT App LEXIS 174; State v. Smit 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203.

•

Under State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah 1997), prejudice is shown if there is proof of
actual bias, an abuse of discretion, or if there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable
result had the court recused to avoid the appearance of bias. Id. at 611, _617.
The court's failure to recuse constituted obvious error, as it tolerated, at a minimum,
the appearance of bias or prejudice "damaging to the public confidence in the legal system,"

•

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 283,289 (Utah 1989), and did not protect "the purity and
integrity of the judicial process" from "any taint or suspicion," and ensure that the "public

•

and litigants ... have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts,"
Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520,523 (Utah 1948). See also State v. Nedey, 748 P.2d
1091, 1094 (Utah 1988)(" a judge should recuse himself when his "impartiality" might

•

reasonably be questioned. . .. the integrity of the judicial system should be protected against
any taint of suspicion."), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1220 (1988). The judge's service also violated

•

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process standards, which do not require proof of actual bias,
but require relief if there is an impermissible risk of prejudgment or actual bias or temptation
leading away from balanced judging. See Caperton v. AC. Massey, Inc., 556 U.S. 868

•

(2009).
The judge's failure to recuse violated the law forbidding judges to sit if they are biased

•

or prejudiced, for as Haslam recognizes, "undue friendship or favoritism" toward a party
constitutes a disqualifying bias or prejudice. 190 P.2d at 523.
23

The judge's ongoing service despite her marriage to the Chief Deputy over the

•

Criminal Division of the office prosecuting Cooper also violated the plain language of
various rules. Canon 1 of the code requires judges to "avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety'' and to "uphold and promote the ... integrity an, and impartiality of the

•

judiciary." Rule 1.2 states:

A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes - and shall not
undermine -public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
Canon 2 states "A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially ... " and Rule
2.2 require judges to "perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." Rule 2.3
requires judges to "perform the duties of judicial office ... without bias or prejudice." Rule
2.4(B) states that "A judge shall not permit family ... relationships to influence the judge's
- judicial conduct or judgment."6 Rule 2.11 requires judges to disqualify themselves "in any
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned .."
The State does not present any Utah case law to contest that the judge's service despite
her marriage to the Chief Deputy of the Criminal Division of the Weber County Attorney's
Office and prior service in the same position as Cooper's prosecutor gave rise to the
6 The State relies on a pleading filed by Cooper's juvenile court prosecutor arguing
but not averring that the judge's husband was not involved in the juvenile court prosecution.
State's brief at 60. Assuming the assertions to be true, they do not disprove that the juvenile
court judge's order delivered Cooper into the adult system, where the judge's husband was
the chief deputy of the criminal division in the office prosecuting Cooper, and that the
judge's husband was directly involved in Cooper's case. Given his role as the chief criminal
deputy in that office, his involvement in the case should have been readily foreseeable to the
judge, who was tasked with determining whether Cooper would remain in the juvenile court,
or be transferred to the adult court, as the Weber County Attorney's Office desired.
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appearance of impropriety, or the appearance of bias. Nor does the State dispute that actual
bias was present, or that the Fourteenth Amendment standard was violated. Aside from

•

disputing whether one of the nonexclusive list of examples in Rule 2.11 applies, State's brief
at 58-60, the State does not address, or refute that the judge's failure to recuse violated, the

•

foregoing provisions of law.
Contrary to the State's positio~ Cooper has established that he was prejudiced by the
court's failure to recuse. The judge's legal errors satisfy the abuse of discretion standard.

•

See, e~ State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,,r,f 15-17, 127 P .3d 692 (review for abuse of discretion
includes review for errors of law). The abuse of discretion shows prejudice under Alonzo,

•

supra.

Given how the court's retention analysis was consistently skewed against Cooper,

contrarily to the law, see Point II, supra, Cooper has shown a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result had the judge recused for the appearance of bias. This independently shows

•

prejudice under Alonzo. Finally, Cooper has shown actual bias stemming from the judge's
marriage to the Chief Criminal Deputy of the office prosecuting Cooper, given that actual

•

•

bias is defined as "undue friendship or favoritism" toward a party,~ Haslam, 190 P.2d
520, 523 (Utah 1948). This again proves prejudice under Alonzo and entitles him to relie£

CONCLUSION
The individual and cumulative effect of the foregoing errors justifies an opinion

•

reversing the bindover order, vacating Cooper's convictions and pleas, and remanding the
case to the juvenile court. See F.L. and Lara, supra.
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Respectfully submitted on September 13, 2015.
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